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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD LEWIS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14486

LYNN S. PORTER, dba
LYNN S. PORTER HOUSE MOVERS,
Defendant and Appellant,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff to recover
monies due and owing Plaintiff under an oral contract for
services rendered to Defendant,

In this brief Appellant

shall be referred to as Defendant and Respondent shall be
referred to as Plaintiff.

References to the Clerk's Tran-

script shall be designated CT and references to the
Reporter's Transcript shall be designated TR.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
•

The Court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment to

Plaintiff on his Complaint in the amount of $9,078.77 plus
costs.

From this judgment, Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court in his favor.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since 1947, Defendant had employed Plaintiff on various
occasions as a laborer and foreman in moving houses and
buildings for Defendant.

(TR 31).

In May, 1973 Plaintiff

was once again employed by Defendant to run an outfit and
move new and older houses.

(TR 7, 8).

Pursuant to the agreement between the parties, Plaintiff
moved a substantial number of new and older homes between
June 1 and December 23, 1973.

(TR 24, 25). As the work

proceeded, Defendant withheld sums of monies from the Plaintiff and refused to pay Plaintiff even though demand was made
by Plaintiff upon Defendant for payment.

(TR 30).

terminated the agreement on or about the 23rd day of
December, 1973.

(TR 10).
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Defendant

-3On March 20, 1974, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the
above entitled matter,
filed his Answer.

(CT 1).

(CT 5).

taken on April 17, 1975.

On April 6, 1974, Defendant

Depositions of the parties were
(CT 14A).

Defendant's counsel,

Hillyard & Gunnell, Gordon J. Low, withdrew as attorneys for
Defendant on October 20, 1975.

(CT 7).

Defendant's present

counsel gave Notice of Change of Attorney on October 22,
1975.

(CT 8).

A Notice of Readiness for Trial was filed

with tfhe Clerk of said Court (CT 9), and on October 24,
1975, the Clerk gave Notice of Trial Setting with a second
setting on December 3, 1975.

(CT 10).

On November 19,

1975, the Clerk gave notice that the Court would hear the
matter on December 3, 1975.

(CT 11).

On December 3, 1975, the Court convened for the trial
of the case.

Plaintiff was present together with his witnesses

and was represented by his attorneys, Olson, Hoggan &
Sorenson, David W. Sorenson.

Defendant was not present, but

was represented by his attorneys, Preston, Harris, Harris &
Preston, George W. Preston.

(CT 12).

Defendant's counsel

represented to the Court that he had advised the Defendant
of the trial date and could not explain the absence of his
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-4client except to state that Defendant had gone on vacation
and asked for a continuance.

(TR 3).

objected to the continuance.

The Court denied Defendant's

motion, and the trial proceeded.

Plaintiff's counsel

(TR 4 ) .

The trial was concluded on December 4, 1975, and at the
conclusion of the case, the trial court while still sitting
on the bench rendered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
against the Defendant for the sum of $9,078.77, together
with costs of Court.

(TR 87, 88). On December 10, 1975,

Plaintiff's counsel forwarded to Defendant's attorney the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment
and Decree for signature for approval as to form.

(CT 15-19).

On December 11, 1975, the Defendant filed a Motion to Reopen or
in the Alternative for a New Trial.

(CT 22).

On the same

day the Motion was filed, the Court signed the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Laxv and the Judgment and Decree.
(CT 17, 18). Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant's
Motion and on January 20, 1976 (CT 25), the Court denied the
Defendant's Motion.

(CT 34, 36). On February 19, 1976,

Defendant filed.his Notice of Appeal, requesting that the
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-5Supreme Court of the State of Utah review the District
Court's refusal to reopen the case or in the alternative
grant a new trial.

(CT 40).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE CASE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SO
DOING.
Defendant alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his Motion to Reopen or in the
Alternative for a New Trial,

The burden to shoxtf an abuse

lies upon the party claiming the abuse.

Anderson v.

Johnson, 268 P.2d 427, 1 Utah 2d 400 (1954).

The Defendant

elected to take a vacation to Hawaii rather than appear
for trial.
,r

. . . I advised Mr, Porter, the defendant, of
the trial date, and apparently notwithstanding
the fact that Ifd advised him there must be
some mixup, because I thought he was advised of
the trial date, yet he is obviously taking a
vacation, which seems absolutely Inconsistent
with his best interests. I can't imagine a
man knowingly taking a vacation having recognized he had his obligation to be in court,
and particularly considering the sum involved."
(TR 3).
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,

Q And you!ve heard counsel's testimony that
he is in Hawaii?
A Yes, sir." (TR 20,

"21>M

That at said time I had made prior arrangements
to go on a vacation with my family to Hawaii."
(CT 23).

Defendant now claims that such conduct should be excused
and that the Court should have allowed him additional trial
time to present his testimony.

In his Affidavit for his

Motion before the Court, Defendant alleges that:
1. He had already planned to go to Hawaii and
that his attorney was entering into negotiations
and that the trial was not ready because the
Defendant had not turned over certain materials
to Plaintiff's attorney as requested,
2. He had offsets and claims which were not
presented because Defendant did not know what
was needed until the trial, and
3. That certain witnesses were not known until
Plaintiff's testimony. (CT 23, 24). (Emphasis
added).
The essential claims made by the Defendant relate, in
actuality, to the conduct of the Defendant not the Plaintiff.
At the time of trial, Defendant1s attorney rather than saying
that the continuance should be granted because of pending or
continuing negotiations between the parties, or that the
Defendant had failed to discover additional facts and
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-7witnesses, stated that he xvas at a loss to explain why
the Defendant was not present in Court.

(TR 3).

Defendant had nearly 21 months to discover the evidence
and witnesses that the Plaintiff would produce; yet, it was
not until after the trial was over that Defendant made any
allegation as to the need for additional discovery.

(CT 22).

The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision on January 20,
1976, in response to Defendant's Motions and stated:
"The defendant filed a motion to reopen
or in the alternative for a new trial on the
grounds the defendant claims that he assumed
the trial would not be held and went on vacation. There is nothing in the record to show
that he could make any such assumption. And
on the further grounds that certain books,
records, and documents need to be examined
and that it was not knox^n in a discovery procedure that such was needed until the time of
trial.
The action was commenced March 20, 1974,
and was tried on December 3, 1975, nearly
two years later. It would appear that the
defendant had ample time for whatever discovery was needed prior to trial and he could
have determined what books, records, and
documents the plaintiff was relying on to
support his claim.n (CT 34).
Certainly, Defendant failed to use reasonable diligence
in producing his evidence at the time of trial, and such
diligence is necessary for a Motion for New Trial.
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In the

-8case of Hydraulic Cement Block Co. v. Christensen, 114 Pac. 524,
38* Utah 525 (1911) the Court stated:
l!

Courts cannot grant nex^ trials merely because
a defeated party, after an adverse decision,
makes a showing that upon a second trial he can
produce additional evidence in support of his
contentions which will probably turn the decision
in his favor. He must use due diligence to produce his evidence when the case comes on for
trial, and, unless he does so, the court is
powerless to help him. In this case there is
no showing whatever that the plaintiff used
any diligence to produce the alleged nex^ly
discovered evidence at the trial. The court,
therefore, committed no error in overruling
the motion for that reason," 114 Pac. at 526.
See also Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 161 Pac. 50, 48
Utah 606 (1916).

And in Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Stoutt,

180 Pac 182 the Utah Supreme Court stated:
,T

(3) But the serious question presented
for our consideration is, Did the plaintiff
use reasonable diligence to procure the proposed testimony for use at the trial of the
case? If he did not, it does not matter how
material or beneficial the testimony may have
been on a new trial, his motion for a new
trial should not prevail. The statute in relation to this ground for a new trial says:
f
Nextfly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial. ! lf
(Emphasis by the Court.) 180 Pac. at 184.
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It was the Defendant, by his own admission, (1) who
chose a course of action which took him out of the state on
vacation when he was to have been present for trial (CT 23) 5
(2) xtfho failed to present his alleged offsets and counterclaims, (3) who failed to ascertain the witnesses necessary
to his defense, and (4) who failed to raise what he now
considers proper objections, in a timely fashion.

He was

represented by counsel, had his witnesses testify and has had
his day in court; he cannot-now complain.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
allows the trial court discretion as to whether it will
reopen a case or not.

This court has stated in Tuft v.

Brotherson, 150 P.2d 384, 106 Utah 499 (1944), that a
motion to reopen a case after the trial court has taken it
under advisement but before it has announced its decision
is addressed to the trial court's discretion; and, in
absence of a showing that such discretion has been abused,
the trial court1s ruling will not be disturbed.

The same

principle would certainly seem to apply in the present case
where the trial court had announced its decision from the
bench at the conclusion of the trial and before the Motion
to Reopen was made.

(CT 87, 88). In the instant case, the
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-10court saw the witnesses and heard their testimony, made
rulings during the trial and allowed and denied the admission of testimony and evidence.

The trial court was

close to the entire trial, and having taken into consideration the total circumstances of the case, rendered its
judgment and denied the Defendant's Motions.

In Barber v.'

Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 (1974), this Court, in discussing
the deference to be given a trial court1s discretionary
rulings, stated:
tf

. . . In situations where the exercise of
discretion is appropriate, considerable weight
should be given to the determination of the
trial court, whichever way it goes. This is
true because due to his close involvement
with the parties, the witnesses, and the
total circumstances of the case, he is in
the best position to judge what the interests
of justice require in safeguarding the rights
and interests of all parties concerned.11
Finally, in addressing this specific point, the California
Third District Court of Appeal, in a similar vein to that
of this Court in the Tuft case, stated in Pocock v. Deniz,
286 P.2d 466, 134 C.A.2d 758 (1955) that whether a motion
to reopen a case after the close of the evidence should be
granted rests in the sound discretion of the trial court,
and it is seldom that the record will justify a reversal
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-11of the judgment on the ground that error was committed in
denying a motion to reopen.

The court goes on to further

elucidate this point and says:
11

. . . (N)umerous cases have held that such a
motion (to reopen) is properly denied, unless
the court is satisfied that there is good
excuse shox^n why the evidence sought to be
introduced after reopening could not have
been produced before the close of the evidence. • .fr
286 P. 2d at 469.

Defendant has failed to meet this burden in

the present case.
The Defendant has failed to cite any specific grounds
which support his allegation that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to grant Defendant's Motion to Reopen
or in the Alternative for a New Trial.

Indeed, he has

failed in his burden to show whereon any charge of abuse
of discretion could be adequately founded.
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court
should sustain the trial court's denial of the Defendant's
Motion to Reopen or in the Alternative for a Nex* Trial as
no abuse of discretion x^hatsoever is evident.
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-12P.OINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT AGAINST LYNN S. PORTER
dba LYNN S. PORTER HOUSE MOVERS, AN-INDIVIDUAL, AS THE
DEFENDANT ENTERED THE CONTRACT AS AN INDIVIDUAL, ADMITTED
HIS CAPACITY TO BE SUED INDIVIDUALLY AND FAILED TO RAISE
TIMELY OBJECTIONS THERETO.
The Court's attention is respectfully directed to page
8 of the Defendant's Brief, where it is alleged that the
trial court erred in entering judgment against ". . . Plaintiff, Lynn S. Porter dba Lynn S. Porter Housemovers, an
individual.!f

The word "Defendant" was likely intended since

the allegation as written is not correct.

Judgment was

entered for Lloyd Lewis, Plaintiff, and against Lynn S.
Porter dba Lynn S. Porter House Movers, an individual,
Defendant.

(TR 87, 88 & CT 18).

Assuming the Defendant meant to use the word "Defendant"
as indicated above, it is submitted that the trial court was
correct in entering judgment against the Defendant in his
capacity as an individual*

Two grounds of support for this

contention are found in the law and the facts.
First, the Defendant admitted that he was a proper
party to the lawsuit and that he was being sued in a proper
capacity when he filed an Answer to the Plaintiff1s Complaint
and also in the Answer itself.
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-13Plaintiff!s Complaint alleges as follows:
"2.
That on or about June 1, 1973, Plaintiff
and Defendant entered into an Agreement whereby
Plaintiff would render services to the Defendant
in the form of moving houses for Defendant.
3, That between June 1, 1973^ and December 31,
1973, Plaintiff moved houses for Defendant for
which Defendant agreed to pay the Plaintiff."
(CT 1).
Defendant's Answer to those allegations stated as
follows:
"3.
Answering paragraph two, Defendant
admits the same.
4. Answering paragraph three, Defendant
admits that Plaintiff moved houses between said
dates but denies the balance of said paragraph."
(CT

5).

. : S ; -

.:•

Y?-...^:---,

••;•• " d -

It appears that the matter has been conclusively
determined by Defendant's pleadings in this case.

In 61

Am.Jur.2d, "Pleading,11 p. 604, it is noted:
"In thus pleading (to the merits or in bar),
the defendant likewise admits the capacity
in which he is sued."
This Court has treated this issue in McFarland's Estate v.
Holt, 417 P.2d 244, 18 Utah 2d 127 (1966).

The Court

said:
"One Ttfho files a pleading asking the court to
act thereon vouches for its verity and should
not thereafter be permitted to repudiate it
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-14for the purpose of upsetting the action the
court has taken pursuant to his request.11
417 P.2d at 245.
The State of Colorado has taken the same position in
Skeens v. Kroh, 489 P.2d 347, 30 Col. App. 88 (1971).

It

states:
"Specific admissions in the pleadings preclude
the pleader from later taking a position inconsistent with the existence of the facts admitted.11
The second ground supporting the trial court's ruling
is based on the fact that Defendant has raised no timely
objection, as to the capacity in which he is sued.

In fact

the question of capacity was not raised during the trial
nor, in any of Defendant's motions following trial.

It

was first raised in Defendant's Brief on appeal at page 8.
Accordingly, Defendant should be deemed to have waived any
objection to capacity.
If the Defendant had disagreed with the allegations in
the Plaintiff's Complaint, he had ample time to raise objections and avenues were open to him to respond to an
alleged misjoinder or nonjoinder, i.e., Rules 8(b), (d) and
12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The fact remains,

however, that the Defendant admitted the relationship between
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-15the parties in his Answer (CT 5); and the record is silent
as to any motions or objections prior to or during the
course of the trial.
The following paragraphs demonstrate the stance of the
law, and particularly the law in Utah, as it pertains to
the failure to raise an objection to an alleged defect of
parties.
This Court addressed the matter in Buhler v. Maddison,
166 P.2d 205, 109 Utah 245 (1946).

The appellant had

raised the objection of a defect of parties defendant.

The

Court found it to have been waived, however, as the cause
had been tried twice before in the lower court and the same
defect, if there was one, had been present and not raised.
The fact that the present case has been tried only once in
the lower court is not enough to take it out of the limits
of the rule.

The determinative factor is that no objection

was raised below or at any time until now/
In 59 Am.Jur.2d, "Parties," p. 729, it states:
"As a general rule, unless the defendant
promptly raises the question of defect of parties in the manner pointed out by the local
practice provisions for taking objections to
a defect of parties, he is deemed to waive the
objection and it cannot be injected at a later
stage of the proceedings."
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-16In Steele v. Wilkinson, 349 P.2d .1117, 10 Utah 2d
159 (1960), this Court dealt with the assignment of error
in the giving of certain instructions to the jury, said
assignment not being made in the lower court.

The Court

stated:
!!

. . . Many of the objections now urged on
appeal were not urged in the trial court
and thus need not be considered by this
court, there being no showing of special
circumstances why these objections were
not made below.n
349 P.2d at 1119.
Finally, in Huber v, Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 106 Utah
363 (1944), this Court stated:
11

• . . It is elementary that when a party does
not raise objections below when he had notice
and opportunity to object, he may not be heard
to complain for the first time on appeal. We
hold, therefore, that the defendant waived all
of these defects, if any there were, by failing
to object below and we shall not further consider them. . . .fl
145 P.2d at 783.
The trial court was correct in entering Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Laxtf and Judgment against Lynn S. Porter
dba Lynn S. Porter House Movers, an individual, because
Defendant has raised no objection whatsoever by way of
pleadings, motion or oral protest from the filing of the
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-17Complaint to the present appeal.

Indeed, it seems clear

that the relationship involved was that of a personal
contract between the parties, irrespective of any other
legal capacity the parties may have separately maintained.
The trial courtTs action should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant, as an individual, entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff, whereby the Defendant agreed to pay
the Plaintiff to move houses for him.

In addition to moving

houses for the Defendant, the Plaintiff advanced costs for
and on behalf of the Defendant.

Timely demand was made

upon the Defendant for sums due and owing the Plaintiff.
The Defendant refused to pay the sums, and suit was filed
therefor.

At the conclusion of a trial on the merits and

while the Court was still on the bench a judgment was
entered for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the
amount of $9,078.77,
This judgment should be affirmed over the grounds urged
by the Defendant for reversal.

No abuse of discretion has

been shown on the part of the trial court in refusing to
reopen the case or in the alternative, In refusing to
grant a motion for a new trial.

The Defendant admitted his
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-Incapacity to be sued individually or in the alternative,
waived any objection he might have to the capacity in which
he is sued by failing to raise timely objection.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON

^\^c^^f/<) • ^£-

David W. Sorensonr
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
56 West Center
Logan, Utah 84321
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